Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 103 | Issue 1

Article 7

Winter 2013

Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those
Who Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A
Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for
Reform
Rebecca Stephens

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Stephens, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State
Statutes and Recommendations for Reform, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 309 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10301-0309
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 103, No. 1
Printed in U.S.A.

DISPARITIES IN POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES FOR THOSE WHO PLEAD
GUILTY AND THOSE CONVICTED AT
TRIAL: A SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Rebecca Stephens*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 1991, a fourteen-year-old girl named Cateresa
Matthews went missing in her hometown of Dixmoor, Illinois.1 A few
weeks later, her body was found in a nearby field; she had been sexually
assaulted and died from a gunshot wound to the mouth.2 In late October
and early November 1992, police arrested five suspects, all between the
ages of fourteen and sixteen, named Robert Taylor, Robert Lee Veal,
Jonathan Barr, James Harden, and Shainne Sharp—a group that later came
to be known as the “Dixmoor Five.”3 After lengthy interrogations by
police, three of the teens confessed to the crime, each implicating the five
teens who were ultimately charged.4 During the pretrial investigation, DNA
testing was conducted on sperm recovered from the victim’s body; the
results excluded all five of the teenagers. Regardless, the State continued to

*
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gratitude to Stuart Chanen and Professor Joshua Tepfer for inspiring the topic of this
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1
Steve Mills & Andy Grimm, After Years in Prison, Men Cleared of Dixmoor Crime,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2011, § 1, at 12.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF
YOUTH, http://www.cwcy.org/englewood_dixmoor.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
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press charges against all five suspects.5
Two of the teens—Robert Veal and Shainne Sharp—agreed to plead
guilty and testify against the other three in exchange for shorter sentences. 6
The other three were convicted after trials, and each was sentenced to at
least eighty years in prison.7 Both Veal and Sharp have since recanted their
testimony, confessions, and statements implicating the other three men.8
In November 1994, thirty-year-old Nina Glover was found naked and
strangled to death in a dumpster in the Englewood neighborhood of
Chicago’s South Side.9 Four months later, a tip allegedly led police to
investigate five teenagers in the murder—Terrill Swift, Harold Richardson,
Michael Saunders, Vincent Thames, and Jerry Fincher.10 After intense,
hours-long interrogations, during which the teenagers were not
accompanied by counsel or allowed to speak to family members, police said
that all five had confessed to raping and killing the woman, although there
were major factual discrepancies in their statements.11 Semen was
identified on samples collected from the victim’s body and an early form of
DNA testing was conducted, excluding all five suspects as possible
contributors. Despite this evidence, the prosecutors went forward with the
trials.12 Though it is unclear why the prosecutors continued with the trials
after the only physical evidence from the crime excluded all five of the
teenagers, later statements by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office
(CCSAO) indicated that the prosecutors felt that the confessions alone were
strong enough evidence of the teenagers’ guilt.13
Three defendants—Terrill Swift, Harold Richardson, and Michael
Saunders—were convicted almost exclusively based on the confessions and
5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.; see also Meet the Exonerated: Vincent Thames, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilthamesvSummary.htm
l (last visited February 26, 2013).
11
Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4.
12
Id.
13
See Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests ‘Innocent,’ Some Prosecutors Cling
to ‘Maybe,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at A19 (quoting State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez,
“DNA evidence in and of itself is not always the ‘silver bullet’ that it is sometimes perceived
to be”); see also Jason Meisner, Exonerations Urged for 7 Convicted in ’90s, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 1, 2011, §1, at 4 (quoting a CCSAO spokesperson, “DNA evidence is not always in and
of itself the factor that would lead to the dismissal or filing of charges”).
6
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sentenced to prison terms ranging from thirty to forty years. A fourth,
Vincent Thames, after seeing two of the others convicted at trial and
sentenced to lengthy prison terms, pleaded guilty and received a thirty-year
sentence.14 These four men later became known as the “Englewood
Four.”15 The fifth defendant’s confession was suppressed and prosecutors
dropped the charges against him.16 All five of the men claimed their
confessions were coerced and false and have since maintained their
innocence.
In the state of Illinois, those who plead guilty are barred from later
seeking DNA testing on the evidence in their cases.17 As a result, Robert
Veal and Shainne Sharp from the Dixmoor case and Vincent Thames from
the Englewood case had no way to prove their innocence. However, in
2011, their codefendants who were convicted at trial successfully petitioned
courts to have relevant DNA evidence retested and run through the
Combined DNA Index System to see if a match could be found.18 In each
case, the DNA was found to match a violent, career criminal. In the
Dixmoor case, the DNA matched a man who already had one rape
conviction, and in the Englewood case, the DNA matched a man who had
already been convicted of one murder and charged in another after his DNA
was found on each of the victims’ bodies.19
In each case, the defendants who had lost at trial quickly filed motions
to vacate their convictions.20 However, in both cases the State argued that
the defendants who pleaded guilty were barred from participating in those
postconviction proceedings.21 While the Illinois postconviction statute does
not explicitly bar individuals who plead guilty from filing postconviction
petitions, prosecutors argued that because the DNA testing statute has been
interpreted as excluding those who plead guilty from petitioning the court
14
Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 4, People v. Thames, No. 95 CR 09676-02 (Cir.
Ct. Ill. June 5, 2012).
15
See Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4.
16
Id.
17
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012); People v. O’Connell, 879
N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007).
18
Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
People’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Joint Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant
to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 at 14–15, People v. Thames, No. 95CR-15660 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 14,
2011); People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief from Judgment of Conviction Pursuant
to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 at 4, People v. Veal, No. 93CR-7347 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Aug. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief].
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for forensic testing, the postconviction statute providing relief from
judgments should also be interpreted as barring them from filing motions
for postconviction relief.22 Prosecutors further argued that those who
pleaded guilty should not be able to “bootstrap” their claims onto the claims
of the other men.23
The Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four cases were before two
different judges, and the two judges interpreted the statute in conflicting
ways. In September 2011, the Dixmoor Five case was argued before Judge
Michelle Simmons, who ultimately agreed with the State’s arguments and
dismissed Robert Lee Veal’s postconviction petition, holding that, as a
result of his guilty plea, he was barred from the postconviction proceedings
to which his codefendants who went to trial were entitled.24 Ultimately, on
November 3, 2011, the CCSAO formally requested that Judge Simmons
vacate the convictions of the Dixmoor Five and to nolle prosequi future
charges.25 Judge Simmons entered an order vacating the convictions of the
three codefendants who went to trial and, a little while later, also vacated
the convictions of the two codefendants who pleaded guilty, thus rendering
the issue moot.26
However, in the Englewood Four case, the judge reached a different
conclusion. On October 10, 2011, attorneys for the Englewood Four and
the State argued their respective motions before Judge Paul Biebel Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County. On November 16, 2011, Judge Biebel issued a written decision
holding that those who plead guilty are “not barred from seeking relief
pursuant to Section 2-1401,” the Illinois statute establishing a process by
which a defendant may seek relief from a judicial order more than thirty
days after its entry.27 The judge vacated the convictions of all four of the
codefendants.28
As demonstrated by the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four cases, the
22
People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief, supra note 21. Some of the author’s
familiarity with the Dixmoor and Englewood cases comes from her work in the Center on
Wrongful Convictions of Youth at Northwestern University School of Law.
23
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, People v. Veal, No. 93CR-7347 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept.
23, 2011).
24
Id. at 37–38.
25
James Harden, Jonathan Barr, and Robert Taylor’s Joint Petition for Certificates of
Innocence at 7, People v. Harden et al., Nos. 92CR-27247 & 95CR-23475 (Cir. Ct. Ill. June
6, 2012).
26
Id.
27
Order at 5, People v. Thames et al., No. 95CR-9676 (Nov. 16, 2011).
28
Id.
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law in Illinois governing postconviction remedies for those who plead
guilty is unclear and has been interpreted in different and conflicting ways.
The postconviction laws in other states are equally diverse and unclear with
regard to those who plead guilty.29 Part II of this Comment analyzes the
postconviction remedies available in all fifty states, including access to
DNA or other forensic testing and general postconviction remedies, and
considers how those who plead guilty are treated differently from those who
were convicted at trial. Part III argues that to treat those who plead guilty
differently from those who are convicted at trial is inherently unjust.
Finally, Part IV provides legislative recommendations to ensure that all
people are treated equally in the postconviction context and given
opportunities to demonstrate their innocence.
II. BACKGROUND
Generally, there are three main types of postconviction remedies
governed by state statute—DNA or other forensic testing, general
postconviction remedies, and habeas corpus petitions. For the purposes of
this Comment, “DNA or other forensic testing” refers to the ability of
someone who has been found guilty of a crime to petition on his own behalf
for forensic testing of DNA or other evidence related to the crime he was
charged with. “General postconviction remedies” are procedures through
which a prisoner requests a court to vacate or correct a conviction or
sentence.30 These include, but are not limited to, the ability of someone
who has been convicted of a crime to petition on her own behalf to correct
errors of fact or law in her underlying conviction, allege ineffective
assistance of counsel, or bring new evidence to the attention of the trial
court. “Habeas corpus” refers to the ability of someone who has been
convicted of a crime to petition the court for a writ to ensure that his or her
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.31
A. DNA OR OTHER FORENSIC TESTING
Currently the District of Columbia and all states besides Oklahoma
have statutes covering the postconviction right to DNA or other forensic
testing.32 The laws granting postconviction petitioners the right to request
29

See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing,
72 A.L.R. 6TH 227 (2012).
30
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (8th ed. 2004).
31
See id. at 728.
32
Buckman, supra note 29, § 2; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92
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DNA or other forensic testing vary significantly among the states,33 and
most state statutes do not directly address the issue of whether people who
pleaded guilty can apply to have the evidence from their cases tested.34
While some states explicitly grant guilty pleaders the right to apply for
DNA or other forensic testing,35 others explicitly exclude those who plead
guilty from utilizing these provisions.36 Other states place different
limitations on postconviction DNA or other forensic testing, such as time
barriers, extra requirements for those who plead guilty, or testing for only
certain categories of cases.37 The remaining states leave open the question
MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1673 (2008) (providing an overview of postconviction DNA testing
statutes for those who claim they were wrongfully convicted); Michael P. Luongo, Note,
Post-Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA Evidence: Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 134 (2010). Massachusetts recently
passed a postconviction DNA testing statute, Senate Bill 1987, on February 17, 2012. 2012
Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West).
33
See sources cited supra note 32.
34
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2011) (“An individual convicted of a
capital offense who is serving a term of imprisonment or awaiting execution of a sentence of
death, through written motion to the circuit court that entered the judgment of sentence, may
apply for the performance of forensic . . . (DNA) testing on specific evidence . . .”); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2001) (“At any time, a person who was convicted of and
sentenced for a felony offense and who meets the requirements of this section may request
the forensic . . . [DNA] testing of any evidence . . . .”).
35
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011) (“[T]he right to file a motion for
postconviction DNA testing provided by this section is absolute and shall not be waived.
This prohibition applies to, but is not limited to, a waiver that is given as part of an
agreement resulting in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10
(West 2008) (“The court shall grant the motion if . . . [t]he evidence subject to DNA analysis
is material to . . . evidence . . . admitted to at a guilty plea proceeding.”).
36
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (“An offender
is not an eligible offender under division (C)(1) of this section regarding any offense to
which the offender pleaded guilty or no contest.”).
37
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (2003 & Supp. 2011) (“A person who
has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime under the laws of this State that carries the
potential punishment of imprisonment of at least one year and for which the person is in
actual execution of either a pre-Maine Criminal Code sentence of imprisonment, including
parole, or a sentencing alternative pursuant to Title 17-A, section 1152, subsection 2 that
includes a term of imprisonment or is subject to a sentence of imprisonment that is to be
served in the future because another sentence must be served first may . . . mov[e] the court
to order DNA analysis of evidence.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.690 (2011) (“A person may file
in the circuit court in which the judgment of conviction was entered a motion requesting the
performance of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing on specific evidence if the person: (1)
Is incarcerated in a Department of Corrections institution as the result of a conviction for
aggravated murder or a person felony as defined in the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission; or (2) Is not in custody but has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder
or a sex crime as defined in ORS 181.594.”).
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of whether guilty pleaders can apply for DNA or forensic testing; however,
some use language regarding trials that could imply that the remedy was
meant to be limited solely to those who pleaded not guilty and were
convicted by a jury.38
1. States Granting Those Who Plead Guilty the Right to
DNA or Other Forensic Testing
Currently, thirteen states and the District of Columbia explicitly grant
those who plead guilty the right to DNA or other forensic testing after the
guilty plea is entered.39 The California and West Virginia statutes provide
that the right to file a motion for postconviction DNA testing is absolute
and may not be waived, thus barring prosecutors from including provisions
in plea agreements that would prevent those who plead guilty from later
petitioning for DNA testing.40 Other statutes allow those who plead guilty
to apply for DNA testing because of the effect that exculpatory DNA results
might have had on the defendants’ decisions to plead guilty.41 The Texas
statute, which requires any applicant for DNA testing to demonstrate that
the perpetrator’s identity was at issue in the underlying conviction, states
that courts are prohibited from finding that identity was not at issue solely
based on a defendant’s guilty plea.42 The remaining statutes simply contain
language including those who plead guilty as a category of individuals who
have the right to apply for DNA testing.43 In 2012, Massachusetts enacted
38
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2101, §§ 29-4119–25 (2008) (“[A] person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a court may, at any time after conviction, file a motion, with or
without supporting affidavits, in the court that entered the judgment requesting forensic
DNA testing of any biological material . . . .”).
39
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011); D.C. CODE §§ 22-4133, 22-4135
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 844D-121 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 19-4901–02 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2008); 2012 Mass. Legis.
Serv. ch. 38 (West); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1–29 (2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035
(West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-D:1–5 (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1A-2 (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 64.01–05 (West 2007); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 974.02, 974.06, 974.07 (West 2011).
40
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14
(LexisNexis 2012).
41
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (2010).
42
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01–05 (West 2007).
43
See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4133, 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 844D-121–133 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901–02 (2004); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1–29 (2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035 (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 651-D:1–5 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 974.02, 974.06, 974.07 (West
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its postconviction DNA and forensic testing statute.44 As the bill was being
considered, some district attorneys called the bill “flawed” because it
allowed those who plead guilty to apply for postconviction DNA testing. 45
However, on February 12, 2012, the bill was signed into law, and in its final
form it explicitly states that “[a] person who pleaded guilty or nolo
contendere in the underlying case may file a motion” for DNA testing.46
Despite not explicitly addressing the issue in its postconviction DNA
testing statute,47 Kansas has also granted those who plead guilty the right to
petition for DNA testing. In State v. Smith, the Court of Appeals of Kansas
overturned the District Court’s decision to deny DNA testing to a man
convicted of rape and sodomy on the sole basis of his guilty plea. 48
Acknowledging that the purpose of the state’s DNA testing statute was to
“determine if one who is in state custody was ‘wrongfully convicted or
sentenced’ and if so, to vacate and set aside the judgment,” the court stated
that to deny all people who plead guilty the ability to apply for DNA testing
would be inconsistent with the broad legislative goals underlying the
statute.49
2. States Denying Those Who Plead Guilty the Right to DNA or Other
Forensic Testing
Currently, Ohio is the only state whose statute explicitly denies those
who plead guilty the right to DNA testing.50 Initially, the statute allowed
inmates who pleaded guilty to a crime that occurred prior to the enactment
of the statute to apply for forensic testing as long as the prosecuting
attorney agreed,51 but in 2007 the Supreme Court of Ohio deemed that
provision unconstitutional.52 As the law stands today, no one who pleads
2011).
44
2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West).
45
Marc Larocque, Post-Conviction DNA Testing Proposal Stirs Debate Among
Advocates, DAs, HERALD NEWS (Nov. 27, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://www.heraldnews.com/
news/x143555067/Post-conviction-DNA-testing-proposal-stirs-debate-among-advocatesDAs.
46
2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West).
47
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2001).
48
State v. Smith, 119 P.3d 679, 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
49
Id. at 683 (quoting State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1265 (Kan. 2004)).
50
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72A(11) (West 2005) (providing that “[a]n offender
is not an eligible offender [to apply for DNA testing] regarding any offense to which the
offender pleaded guilty or no contest”).
51
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.82 (West 2005).
52
State v. Sterling, 864 N.E.2d 630, 636 (Ohio 2007).
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guilty is eligible to apply for DNA testing.
In addition to Ohio’s explicit statutory exclusion of guilty pleaders
from DNA testing, courts in Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania have
also interpreted their respective DNA testing statutes as excluding those
who plead guilty.53 The Illinois statute does not explicitly restrict those
who plead guilty from applying for DNA testing. Instead, it lays out
several statutory requirements that must be met in order for DNA testing to
be granted: identity must have been at issue in the trial resulting in the
defendant’s conviction and the test results must have the scientific potential
to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the
defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.54
In People v. Urioste, the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted these
requirements as indicating a legislative intent to allow postconviction
forensic testing only in those cases “where such testing could discover new
evidence at sharp odds with a previously rendered guilty verdict based upon
criminal acts that the defendant denied having engaged in.”55 The court
went on to note that the “legislature did not want convicted defendants who
admitted at their trial to the commission of the acts charged, and did not
contest the question of who committed those acts, to make a mockery of the
criminal justice system and the statute’s grace.”56 In People v. Lamming,
the Illinois Appellate Court took this analysis a step further, holding that
because the defendant in that case pleaded guilty, “he did not have a trial,
he did not deny committing the acts charged, and identity was not at
issue.”57 Therefore, to allow him (or those who plead guilty in general)
access to forensic testing would be inconsistent with legislative intent.58 In
2007, the Illinois Supreme Court spoke definitively on this issue, holding
that “defendants who plead guilty may not avail themselves of [the
postconviction DNA testing statute].”59
Taking a similar approach, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
interpreted the Pennsylvania forensic testing statute as precluding those

53
See People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 2007); People v. Lamming, 833
N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 716 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000); People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2006); Williams v. Erie Cnty.
Dist. Attorney’s Office, 848 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
54
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012).
55
Urioste, 736 N.E.2d at 712.
56
Id.
57
Lamming, 833 N.E.2d at 928.
58
Id.
59
People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007).
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who plead guilty from later seeking DNA testing.60 The court reasoned that
because the statute requires the applicant to demonstrate that the identity of
the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that led to conviction, an
applicant who pleaded guilty would not be able to meet the requirements of
a prima facie case.61 In addition, the court interpreted the plain meaning of
“proceedings,” as used by the statute, as not encompassing “negotiations
between the prosecution and defense regarding plea bargains.”62
Similarly, the New York statute does not explicitly address whether
those who plead guilty may petition for DNA or forensic testing.63 In
People v. Byrdsong, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court held that defendants who plead guilty are not entitled to DNA testing
because the statute’s references to “trial” indicate a legislative intent to
extend the remedy only those defendants who were convicted by a jury.64
3. States Placing Other Limitations on Who May
Apply for Forensic Testing
Some states place limitations on who may apply for DNA or other
forensic testing without specifically including or excluding petitioners
based solely on the issue of whether they pleaded guilty.65 Two states—
Virginia and Wyoming—currently require those who plead guilty to follow
a separate procedure from those convicted at trial if they wish to apply for
postconviction DNA testing.66 Virginia’s statute allows those who plead
guilty to apply for DNA testing, but once they receive exculpatory results,
some petitioners who plead guilty are barred from applying for a writ of
60
Williams v. Erie Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 848 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2006) (providing that “[w]here the
defendant’s motion requests the performance of a forensic DNA test on specified evidence,
and upon the court’s determination that any evidence containing . . . (“DNA”) was secured in
connection with the trial resulting in the judgment, the court shall grant the application for
forensic DNA testing of such evidence upon its determination that if a DNA test had been
conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the
judgment, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant”).
64
People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2006).
65
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010) (limiting access to forensic testing for
defendants who “did not admit or concede guilt”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-232,
8-201 (LexisNexis 2007) (limiting access to forensic testing by type of crime).
66
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-302–15
(2011).
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actual innocence and must instead apply for executive relief, such as a
pardon.67 In Wyoming, individuals who pleaded guilty prior to January 1,
2000, may petition for DNA testing, but in cases where a guilty plea
occurred after January 1, 2000, courts may not order DNA testing unless
they find that the failure to exercise due diligence in requesting DNA
testing at the time of conviction was the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel.68
Currently, ten states require anyone petitioning for postconviction
DNA testing to demonstrate that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue
in the proceedings that led to conviction.69 However, the states do not agree
on whether the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty means that identity
was not at issue. For example, as discussed above, Illinois courts have
determined that once a defendant pleads guilty, identity is no longer an
issue.70 On the other hand, the Texas forensic testing statute states that “the
convicting court is prohibited from finding that identity was not an issue in
the case solely on the basis of [a guilty] plea, confession, or admission, as
applicable.”71
In the remaining states that require identity to be at issue, it is not clear
how this requirement affects those who plead guilty. For example, South
Dakota permits forensic testing if the defendant meets a list of conditions,
including: “If the petitioner was convicted following a trial, the identity of
the perpetrator was at issue in the trial.”72 The statute is silent as to whether
those who plead guilty are able to obtain DNA testing, but this provision
could be read to suggest that the legislature also intended the statute to
apply to guilty pleaders, who need not demonstrate that identity was at issue
in order to file a petition for forensic testing.
Many state statutes use language that could be interpreted as requiring

67

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.1, 19.2-327.2 (2008). While anyone who pleads not
guilty may be issued a writ of actual innocence, for those who plead guilty, the writ of actual
innocence is only available in Class 1 or 2 felony cases, or felony cases for which the
maximum penalty is imprisonment for life. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (2008).
68
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303(d) (2011).
69
See GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (West 2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3
(LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.16 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 590.01–06 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-110, 46-21-111 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1A-2 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
arts. 64.01–05 (West 2007).
70
People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007).
71
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(b) (West 2007).
72
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2004).
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a trial to have taken place in order for someone to petition for forensic
testing.73 As discussed above, the Illinois statute includes language
referring to the “trial court,” “time of trial,” and “in the trial which resulted
in his or her conviction,” and Illinois courts have interpreted this as
indicating a legislative intent to allow DNA testing only for those who were
convicted after a trial.74
Other state statutes also include references to trial, but courts have yet
to decide whether those statutes exclude those who plead guilty. For
example, the Alabama forensic testing statute provides that an individual
convicted of a capital offense may apply for DNA testing of specific
evidence if such testing was not performed “at the time of the initial trial”
and if “the identity of the perpetrator was at issue in the trial that resulted in
the conviction of the petitioner.”75 The Arizona, Delaware, and Louisiana
forensic testing statutes also include references to trial.76
A confession may also bar postconviction DNA testing; in Alaska and
Pennsylvania, petitioners who make certain types of admissions are
ineligible to seek later DNA testing.77 In Alaska, defendants cannot apply
for postconviction DNA testing if they “admit[ted] or concede[d] guilt
under oath in an official proceeding for the offense that was the basis of the
conviction,” but “the court, in the interest of justice, may waive this
requirement,” and “the entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea is not an
admission or concession of guilt.”78
Some states only allow postconviction DNA testing in cases where the
73

See ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3
(LexisNexis 2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2006).
74
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012); O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d at
319.
75
ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2006).
76
The Arizona statute allows a petitioner to apply for DNA testing if a reasonable
probability exists that “[t]he petitioner’s verdict or sentence would have been more favorable
if the results of [DNA] testing had been available at the trial leading to the judgment of
conviction.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2010). The Delaware statute allows a
motion for DNA testing to be granted if “[t]he testing is to be performed on evidence secured
in relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction.” DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4504
(2011). In Louisiana, petitioners must include in their applications for testing “[a] factual
explanation of why there is an articulable doubt, based on competent evidence whether or
not introduced at trial, as to the guilt of the petitioner.” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
926.1(1) (2006).
77
See ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1 (2011). Note that
Pennsylvania already bars those who plead guilty from postconviction DNA testing. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii).
78
ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010).
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underlying conviction is for certain categories or types of crimes. The
Florida, Louisiana, and Nevada forensic testing statutes allow DNA testing
only in felony cases.79 The Kansas statute allows postconviction DNA
testing only in murder and rape cases, and the Oregon statute provides for
postconviction DNA testing only in aggravated murder, murder, or sex
crime cases.80 The Kentucky statute allows DNA testing in cases where a
person was convicted of and sentenced to death for a capital offense.81 The
Maryland and South Carolina statutes also provide a list of eligible offenses
for postconviction DNA testing.82 In Maine, a person convicted of a crime
that “carries the potential punishment of imprisonment of at least one year”
may apply for DNA testing.83 Further, many states seem to limit DNA
testing to cases in criminal courts, excluding juveniles whose cases were
adjudicated in juvenile courts.84
B. GENERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
Most states have statutes that govern the procedures and remedies
through which defendants can pursue claims regarding constitutional
violations, errors of fact in the underlying proceedings, changes in law since
the conviction occurred, and other issues.85 Only a handful of states’
statutes explicitly address whether those who plead guilty have access to
these remedies;86 most states leave it to the courts to determine whether
those who plead guilty can file postconviction petitions. While most states
allow those who plead guilty to file postconviction petitions, either by
79
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 925.11, 925.12, 943.3251 (West 1998); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 926.1 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0918 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.853.
80
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.690 (2011).
81
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.176, 422.285, 422.287 (LexisNexis 2009).
82
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-232, 8-20 (LexisNexis 2007) (as amended by S.B.
211, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2009).
83
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
84
Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief, 64
ME. L. REV. 554, 559–60 (2012).
85
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901–11 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1221 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9543–51 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78B-9-101–405 (LexisNexis 2009); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008) (providing an overview of postconviction remedies for those
who claim they were wrongfully convicted).
86
See D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 43-21-651, 99-395 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-402
(LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.850.
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statute or by case law, some states provide limitations for those who plead
guilty87 or allow individuals to waive their postconviction rights as part of a
plea agreement.88 Overall, most statutes are not explicit about the rights of
those who plead guilty, so much of the postconviction law governing those
who plead guilty is left open for the courts to determine.
1. States Explicitly Including Those Who Plead Guilty in Their
Postconviction Statutes or Case Law
Only six states and the District of Columbia explicitly include those
who plead guilty in their postconviction statutes.89 Alaska’s statute
provides that “[a] person who has been convicted of or sentenced for a
crime may institute a proceeding for postconviction relief . . . if the person
claims . . . that the applicant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere in order to correct manifest injustice.”90 Arizona’s
postconviction statute states that “[a]ny person who pled guilty or no
contest . . . shall have the right to file a postconviction relief proceeding,”91
and in State v. Ward, the Court of Appeals of Arizona noted that for
defendants who plead guilty, proceedings for postconviction relief are the
only means available for exercising their rights to appellate review.92 Both
the Washington, D.C., and Utah statutes also explicitly give those who
plead guilty the right to petition the court to set aside their guilty pleas on
the grounds of new evidence.93

87
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.3(d) (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543
(2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
88
See DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000); Willett v. State, 993
S.W.2d 929, 929 (Ark. 1999); State v. Valdez, 851 S.W.2d 20, 21–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79, 84–85 (S.C. 2006).
89
See D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-641, 99-395 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-402
(LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.850.
90
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8).
91
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1
92
State v. Ward, 118 P.3d 1122, 1124–25, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
93
In Washington, D.C., “[a] person convicted of a criminal offense . . . may move the
court to vacate the conviction or to grant a new trial on grounds of actual innocence based on
new evidence” by setting forth specific facts “[e]stablishing how that evidence demonstrates
that the movant is actually innocent despite having been convicted at trial or having pled
guilty.” D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001). The Utah postconviction statute provides
that “[i]f the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon a
plea of guilty, the petition shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that
establishes factual innocence.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402 (LexisNexis 2009).
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Though the majority of states’ statutes do not explicitly grant those
who plead guilty access to postconviction remedies, courts in most states
allow those who plead guilty to bring postconviction petitions under the
same statutes as those who are convicted at trial.94
2. States Placing Limitations on Access to Postconviction
Remedies for Those Who Plead Guilty
Several states give those who plead guilty limited access to
postconviction remedies, or access that depends on the issue being raised.95
For example, the Rhode Island postconviction statute allows a petitioner to
bring a postconviction petition alleging that constitutional violations
occurred, the court lacked jurisdiction, his sentence was in violation of the
law, there are newly discovered facts, or any other violation of the law
occurred.96 In Miguel v. State, however, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island stated that “[t]he sole focus of an application for post-conviction
relief filed by an applicant who has pled guilty is ‘the nature of counsel’s
advice concerning the plea and the voluntariness of the plea. If the plea is
validly entered, we do not consider any alleged prior constitutional
infirmity.’”97
94

See, e.g., Connally v. State, 33 So. 3d 618, 620–21 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Graham v.
State, 188 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Ark. 2004); People v. Kirk, 221 P.3d 63, 64–65 (Colo. App.
2009); Odiaga v. State, 950 P.2d 1254, 1255–56 (Idaho 1997); Newton v. State, 456 N.E.2d
736, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Johnson v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000548-MR, 2008
WL 4270731, at *3–4 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2008); Diep v. State, 748 A.2d 974, 976 (Me. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Mass. 1992); State v. Coe, 188 N.W.2d
421, 422 (Minn. 1971); State v. Dunster, 707 N.W.2d 412, 414–15 (Neb. 2005); Hart v.
State, 1 P.3d 969, 971 (Nev. 2000).
95
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.3 (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011). People who plead guilty may also lose out on appellate
rights that those who went to trial would receive. For example, Michigan’s postconviction
statute grants individuals convicted of a felony or misdemeanor at trial an automatic right to
appeal, but states that “[a]ll appeals from final orders and judgments based upon pleas of
guilty or nolo contendere shall be by application for leave to appeal.” MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 770.3(1)(d) (West 2006). This means that defendants who plead guilty do not have
an automatic right to appeal and an appellate court decides whether or not to hear the case.
Bulger v. Curtis, 328 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2004). When several state judges
denied appellate counsel to indigent defendants and the Michigan legislature codified this
practice by statute, the constitutionality of this statute was challenged. Id. at 692. A United
States District Court found the categorical denial of counsel to indigent defendants who had
pleaded guilty to be unconstitutional. See id. However, the decision only pertained to the
right to counsel, so as it stands, the right to postconviction remedies for those who plead
guilty is still only by leave to appeal.
96
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011).
97
Miguel v. State, 774 A.2d 19, 22 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. Dufresne, 436 A.2d 720,
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The Pennsylvania postconviction statute contains a separate provision
for those who plead guilty, which states that a petitioner for postconviction
relief may show that her conviction resulted from “[a] plea of guilty
unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the
inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is
innocent.”98 This provision is included in a list of several other potential
subjects of postconviction petitions, which would appear to indicate that
those who plead guilty are not limited to this type of petition.99 However,
in Commonwealth v. Martinez, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated
that “[a]fter a defendant has entered a plea of guilty the only cognizable
issues in a [postconviction] proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty
and the legality of the sentence.”100
3. The Role of Plea Agreements
In several states, it is legal for defendants to waive their rights to
postconviction remedies in their plea agreements.101 While it is unknown
how many defendants in state court waive their postconviction rights, a
2005 study found that in nearly two-thirds of federal cases settled by a plea
agreement, defendants agreed to waive their rights to review.102 Missouri
allows defendants to waive their rights to seek postconviction relief in
return for reduced sentences if their records demonstrate that the defendants
were properly informed of their rights and that the waivers were made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.103 Arkansas allows defendants to
waive any right to further appeal, postconviction relief, or an attorney as
part of a plea bargain.104 In South Carolina, a capital defendant may waive
postconviction rights as long as two prongs are met: (1) the defendant must
be mentally competent and comprehend his circumstances (the “cognitive
722 (R.I. 1981)).
98
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011).
99
Id. (providing that a petitioner can assert via postconviction petition that his conviction
or sentence resulted from one or more of the following: constitutional violations, ineffective
assistance of counsel, obstruction of justice by government officials, or the unavailability of
exculpatory evidence).
100
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 539 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
101
See DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Willett v. State, 993
S.W.2d 929 (Ark. 1999); State v. Valdez, 851 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79 (S.C. 2006).
102
Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (2005).
103
Jackson v. State, 241 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
104
Willett, 993 S.W.2d at 929–30.
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prong”) and (2) the defendant must also have the ability to assist counsel or
the court in identifying exculpatory or mitigating information (the
“assistance prong”).105
In contrast, several states prohibit the waiver of postconviction rights
in plea agreements. In Hood v. State, the Supreme Court of Nevada noted
the important distinctions between appeal rights, which can be waived in a
plea agreement, and postconviction rights:
Post-conviction remedies differ significantly from a direct appeal. Unlike a direct
appeal, post-conviction proceedings collaterally attack the constitutional validity of
the conviction, or the legality of continued confinement on a basis other than the
manner in which the conviction was obtained. It would be unconscionable for the
state to attempt to insulate a conviction from collateral constitutional review by
conditioning its willingness to enter into plea negotiations on a defendant’s waiver of
106
the right to pursue post-conviction remedies.

Accordingly, the court held that postconviction rights can never be waived
as part of a plea agreement.107 Similarly, Indiana courts have held that
provisions in plea agreements in which defendants waive their rights to
postconviction relief are void and unenforceable.108
C. HABEAS CORPUS
Federal habeas corpus review of state convictions has existed since
1867, when the writ of habeas corpus was made available to state prisoners
“in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.”109
The right to habeas corpus has long been considered a crucial constitutional
right; it is taken seriously by the courts and is never to be suspended except
in times of severe crisis.110 Federal habeas corpus provides a means by
105

Downs, 631 S.E.2d at 85; Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993).
Hood v. State, 890 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1995).
107
Id.
108
Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065, 1067–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
109
Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. Additionally, the Constitution itself
prohibits suspension of the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2. Prior to the passage of this Act, state prisoners could only petition state courts for writs
of habeas corpus, and the federal courts had no habeas corpus jurisdiction over state
prisoners. See Ex Parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845) (“Neither this nor any other
court of the United States, or judge thereof, can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner,
who is in custody under a sentence or execution of a state court, for any other purpose than
to be used as a witness.”).
110
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
106
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which state prisoners can challenge their state court convictions in federal
courts.111 A federal habeas corpus petition may only be filed after a
petitioner has exhausted all possible postconviction remedies in state
court.112
The most commonly used modern federal habeas corpus writ is the
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum used by prisoners seeking collateral
review after the completion of their direct appeals and challenging the
constitutionality of their convictions and sentences.113 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, convicted state prisoners may file motions to “vacate, set aside, or
correct their sentences.”114 While state prisoners may access federal
postconviction proceedings only after completion of direct appeal and
habeas or other collateral proceedings in state court, federal prisoners may
pursue postconviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after completion
of direct appeal.115 This Comment does not address the scope of federal
habeas corpus remedies, instead focusing solely on postconviction rights
provided by state statutes.
“State postconviction remedies . . . are the counterparts to federal
habeas corpus statutes . . . . They exist because of, and are modeled on or
interpreted in light of, the federal statutes that allow relief to those in
custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States.”116 Generally,
state habeas corpus statutes exist to provide a means by which someone
who believes he is being unlawfully committed, detained, confined, or
restrained of his liberty may challenge his detention.
State habeas corpus statutes are usually broad, allowing courts to
review the reasons for detention and prevent abuses of power by the state.
“Every state and the District of Columbia have procedures for collateral
review through applications for writs of habeas corpus or a related remedy
known as writs of error coram nobis.”117 While some states treat their
habeas corpus statutes as their postconviction statutes,118 many states have
111

See generally John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to
Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011).
112
Id. at 442.
113
Sara Rodriguez & Scott J. Atlas, Habeas Corpus: The Dilemma of Actual Innocence,
34 LITIG. 35, 36 (2008).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack: Towards a New State
Postconviction Remedy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 333 (1992).
117
DONALD E. WILKES JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK
§ 1.3 (2006).
118
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34.724 (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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separate statutes for habeas corpus in addition to their general
postconviction statutory schemes.119 Habeas corpus statutes do not
distinguish between those who plead guilty and those who are convicted at
trial, but state habeas corpus statutes differ in their applicability
postconviction. Some states expressly allow individuals to file habeas
corpus petitions once they have been convicted, while others prohibit
anyone from filing a habeas corpus petition to attack the final judgment of a
criminal court.120 As one commentator noted:
State habeas procedures, however, can be difficult. In every jurisdiction, a welldeveloped state court habeas corpus record and complete presentation of the claims
for relief are required for post-conviction success. States often impose short time
limits after a prisoner’s conviction becomes final to commence habeas proceedings.
Applicants cannot merely relitigate claims that could have been raised on direct
appeal. The range of available claims is limited, and, often, the source of such claims
121
depends on information outside the trial record.

Due to the complexity and vast variations among state habeas corpus
statutes, this Comment does not analyze state habeas corpus statutes beyond
the brief overview provided here.122
arts. 11.01, 11.07 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-1 (LexisNexis 2012).
119
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4121–4122 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473
(West 2002); GA. CODE ANN., § 9-14-1 (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-102
(LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-25.5-1-1 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 589.01
(West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2801 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-27-1 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-101 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.36.010 (West 2011).
120
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4310 (West 2006) (“An action for habeas
corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may not be brought by or on behalf of . . . (3)
[p]ersons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-43-3 (2003) (“This chapter shall not apply to any collateral relief sought by any
person following his conviction of a crime. Such relief shall be governed by the procedures
prescribed in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.”); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2801 (2009) (providing that any person, “except persons convicted of some
crime or offense for which they stand committed,” who is confined in jail or unlawfully
deprived of his or her liberty may apply for a writ of habeas corpus); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:67-14 (West 2005) (providing that “[a]ny person committed or restrained of his liberty
by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction or by
virtue of any process issued pursuant thereto” “shall not be entitled to prosecute writ of
habeas corpus”). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-22-101 (2011) (“The writ of habeas corpus
is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been
adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal.”),
invalidated by Lott v. State, 150 P.3d 337, 342 (Mont. 2006) (“In light of the writ’s history
and purpose, as well as Montana’s constitutional guarantee . . . that the writ of habeas corpus
shall never be suspended, we conclude that, as applied to a facially invalid sentence . . . the
procedural bar created by § 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ.”).
121
Robertson, supra note 116, at 333.
122
For more information regarding state and federal habeas corpus procedures and
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III. DISCUSSION
Based on an overview of the postconviction remedies available to
those who plead guilty, it is clear that there is much variation and ambiguity
among the states. While the purposes of postconviction remedies are to
ensure that innocent people are not wrongfully convicted and to prevent
constitutional violations from going without remedy, the lack of
consistency and clarity in these statutes is directly contrary to this goal. As
I argue below, the current system of postconviction remedies in most states
is patently unjust to defendants who plead guilty. First, any distinction in
postconviction rights between those who plead guilty and those who are
convicted at trial is based on a faulty assumption—either that innocent
defendants do not plead guilty or that those who plead guilty have not been
subjected to constitutional violations. Second, limiting postconviction
rights for those who plead guilty is at odds with the purposes underlying a
general system of postconviction remedies. Finally, the lack of clarity in
the laws leads to inconsistent results, denying many deserving petitioners
their rights.
A. INNOCENT PEOPLE PLEAD GUILTY
Any distinction in postconviction remedies between those who plead
guilty and those convicted at trial is based either on the assumption that
innocent people do not plead guilty or on the assumption that constitutional
violations do not occur during the plea-bargaining process. However, there
is much research demonstrating that innocent people do plead guilty; nearly
10% of the first 300 postconviction exonerations were of people who had
pleaded guilty.123 “The factors that give rise to wrongful convictions have
been described with some clarity, and include mistaken eyewitness
identification, erroneous forensic science, coerced confessions, police or
prosecutorial misconduct, use of untruthful informants or other witnesses,
and inadequate or incompetent legal assistance”;124 the same factors can be
remedies, see generally Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent
Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655
(2005); Hon. Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant
Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (2004).
123
When the Innocent Plead Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php (last visited Dec. 22, 2012);
Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.
php (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (showing that twenty-eight of the first 300 DNA
exonerations have been for individuals who pleaded guilty).
124
Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 452
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present regardless of whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty.
People may choose to plead guilty to something they did not do for
many reasons, including: they lack compelling evidence demonstrating their
innocence, they falsely confessed and the confession will be used against
them at trial, they received a more lenient sentence as a result of the plea
deal, their defense attorney or a prosecutor pressured them into it, they are
vulnerable or mentally handicapped, or they feel that they have no other
choice.125 In addition, an innocent person may actually believe that he is
guilty. He may be confused as to his prior actions, fail to understand that
criminal liability requires both an act or omission and intent, be unable to
understand that both the act and intent must be considered criminal, fail to
understand that there is no crime unless the act and intent concur, fail to
realize that transferred intent may not apply, or fail to recognize other
appropriate defenses.126
Aside from evidentiary concerns, mistakes, or misconduct, innocent
defendants may also feel compelled to plead guilty due to some of the
benefits involved. “On balance, plea bargaining is a categorical good for
many innocent defendants, particularly in low-stakes cases,”127 but “even
for innocent defendants facing more serious charges, plea bargaining may
be, at a minimum, the manifestly least-bad option.”128 Innocent defendants
often have incentives to plead guilty because they wish to avoid long
sentences or death sentences that would result from being convicted at trial

(2001) (citing BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000)); see also Jean Coleman
Blackerby, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions and Restoring
Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (2003) (discussing causes of wrongful
convictions and ways to prevent them).
125
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
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for crimes they did not commit.129 Studies have shown that defendants who
maintain their innocence, go to trial, and are found guilty are often given
longer sentences because they are viewed as unremorseful, so defendants
may wish to avoid the possibility of being penalized for going to trial by
taking a lesser sentence through a plea bargain.130
Some attorneys even believe that it is advantageous for innocent
defendants to plead guilty. As one Chicago attorney stated:
A lawyer’s function is simply to minimize the painful consequences of criminal
proceedings for his client. If, for example, I get an offer of probation in a felony case,
I jump at it. It doesn’t matter whether the client tells me he is innocent, whether I
believe him, or even whether I’m 90 percent sure of an acquittal. So long as there is a
131
10 percent chance of a prison sentence, the client is better off to plead.

In the same study, other attorneys reported that “although they usually
refuse to permit ‘innocent’ defendants to plead guilty, they sometimes made
exceptions when prosecutorial offers were unusually generous or unusually
coercive.”132 One public defender even stated that sometimes the attorneys
in his office “decide that they are going to save themselves and the state a
trial” and “put intolerable pressure on a defendant” to plead guilty.133
Before a defendant may plead guilty, the court must establish a factual
basis for the guilty plea, a process that involves “determining what acts and
intent can be attributed to the defendant. If the acts and intent uncovered
through the accuracy inquiry correspond to the elements of the crime to
which the plea is offered, a ‘factual basis’ for the plea is said to exist.”134 In
practice, this requirement is often insufficient to prevent innocent people
from pleading guilty.135
For example, some judges disregard the
importance of this requirement and do not diligently ensure that it is met. A
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survey of Indiana state trial court judges revealed that the state’s lack of
process requirements for factual basis inquiries led judges to “abdicate . . .
their responsibility to ensure that a plea of guilty is voluntarily made with
full appreciation of the consequences of the action.”136 Another study
revealed that “judges often neglect the factual basis requirement and that
questions during pretrial tend to focus on the appropriate sentence rather
than on the factual basis for the plea.”137
Some experts have argued that the factual basis requirement is
“relatively unimportant” and “more form than substance.”138 Prosecutors
also play a role in this process: “Many commentators have noted that the
government’s principal goals in plea bargaining are efficiency and
obtaining convictions, as opposed to justice and fairness.”139 Prosecutors
often hope to secure guilty pleas quickly, “regardless of the factual realities
of a case.”140 Other factors can also contribute to the unfairness of the pleabargaining process and cause innocent people to plead guilty, such as racial
disparities and biases and ineffective assistance of counsel.141
While many have argued that innocent people plead guilty more often
than we think, some have argued that innocent people do not plead guilty at
all, or that the problem is not big enough to truly worry about.142 While it is
impossible to know just how many people who plead guilty are actually
innocent, anecdotal evidence demonstrates that innocent people often feel
compelling pressure to plead guilty. For example, Marcellius Bradford
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served more than six years in Illinois prison for a murder he did not commit
after he pleaded guilty and testified against his codefendants in exchange
for a twelve-year sentence. Bradford later said he was threatened with a life
sentence and coerced to plead guilty and testify. Ultimately, DNA testing
exonerated Bradford and his codefendants and implicated the two men who
actually committed the crime.143
Christopher Ochoa falsely confessed and pleaded guilty to a murder
that he did not commit.144 He later recalled his lawyers pressuring him to
plead guilty:
[They told] him that his detailed confession to a rape and murder was so compelling
that he might receive the death penalty. They told him there was “no way an innocent
person would give such a detailed statement.” He later said that although his lawyers
probably “believed [he] was guilty,” he also had the impression that “it was less
work” for them if he would plead guilty. He was offered a life sentence for his
145
testimony against his also-innocent codefendant, Richard Danziger.

Studies have documented the main causes of false confessions,
including duress, coercion, intoxication, diminished capacity, mental
impairment, ignorance of the law, fear of violence, the actual infliction of
harm, the threat of a harsh sentence, and misunderstanding the sentence.146
“Psychological studies of confessions that have proved false show
overrepresentation of children, the mentally ill and mentally retarded, and
suspects who are drunk or high. They are susceptible to suggestion, eager
to please authority figures, disconnected from reality or unable to defer
gratification.”147 Police officers are also trained to incorporate highly
coercive psychological interrogation tactics, such as implying leniency,
reducing moral responsibility by blaming peer pressure, pretending to have
evidence, and lying to suspects.148 According to the Innocence Project,
false confessions have played a role in 24% of the convictions that have
later been reversed by DNA evidence.149
Some commentators argue that this issue could be better addressed by
stricter enforcement of the factual basis requirements.150 While that would
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certainly help to reduce the number of innocent people who plead guilty, it
is not the only solution to the problem. Undoubtedly, even with more
stringent factual basis requirements, those who are innocent would still feel
compelled to plead guilty. In addition, this could actually be worse for
innocent people; because sentences imposed after trial are often longer than
those attached to guilty pleas, forcing innocent people to go to trial could
result in even more innocent people being in jail. Further, even with strict
enforcement of factual basis requirements, other constitutional violations
may occur that would merit redress in postconviction proceedings.
B. LIMITING POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES FOR THOSE WHO
PLEAD GUILTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF
OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE PURPOSES OF
POSTCONVICTION STATUTES
English jurist William Blackstone wrote in the 1760s that it is “better
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”151 This
ideology underscores our criminal justice system; the Supreme Court has
stated that the “ultimate objective” of our justice system is “that the guilty
be convicted and the innocent go free.”152 That the government should not
allow an innocent person to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit is one
of the basic principles of the U.S. criminal justice system.153 Connecting
these principles to the postconviction context, Justice Marshall stated that
“[h]abeas corpus and civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental importance . . .
in our constitutional scheme’ because they directly protect our most valued
rights.”154
Postconviction remedies were created with this principle in mind. The
first exoneration through the use of DNA testing occurred in 1989, drawing
attention to the national problem of wrongful convictions.155 As a result of
the increasing number of wrongful convictions and exonerations that have
come to light in recent years, numerous states have recognized the
151
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Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
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importance of providing convicted defendants avenues by which to assert or
demonstrate their actual innocence and challenge their convictions. For
example, in 2010, the Ohio legislature passed Senate Bill 77, “one of the
nation’s most comprehensive criminal justice reform packages.”156 The bill
was a package of “sweeping reforms” designed to prevent wrongful
convictions and overturn injustices.157 Ohio Representative Tyrone Yates,
the bill’s sponsor in the House of Representatives, called the bill “one of the
most important pieces of criminal justice legislation in [the] state in a
century.”158
Another Representative, Bill Coley, called the bill a
“tremendous tool for fighting crime” and stated that “[n]one of us in this
state benefit when a wrongly convicted person sits in prison.”159 However,
despite these concerns, the Ohio postconviction statutes do not explicitly
include those who plead guilty, and Ohio’s forensic testing statute explicitly
excludes those who plead guilty.160
When the Illinois legislature originally passed its postconviction
forensic testing statute, state representatives discussed the purpose and
goals of the statute.161 The bill’s sponsor, Peter Roskam, stated, “[I]n my
opinion, this Bill is about doing the right thing. Nobody wants the wrong
person behind bars. Because if the wrong person is behind bars, that means
that there’s a bad person who’s out there, who’s gotten off scot-free.”162
Another representative, Barbara Flynn Currie, stated in support of the bill:
This is a simple issue of basic justice. The prospect of people doing time for crimes
they didn’t commit is one that, I should think, would make each of us, and our
constituents, shudder. We have had examples, not just from DNA evidence, but also
from issues like automated fingerprint identification systems, new technology that can
determine whether or not the person who was convicted, in fact, committed the crime.
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And I think it would be distressing to the folks back home to think that we are not
concerned enough about that possibility that we provide a clear channel, a clear
avenue in the law for someone to reraise that basic issue . . . . It is only about fair play
163
and justice. It’s only about making sure that the innocent do go free.

Despite these noble intentions, Illinois currently does not allow those who
plead guilty to petition for DNA or forensic testing.164 While the Illinois
and Ohio representatives were clearly concerned with fairness and the
administration of justice, they neglected to include in their postconviction
statutes individuals who plead guilty, who can be just as innocent as those
who go to trial.
Many have argued that state interests in finality and efficiency run
counter to allowing those who plead guilty to later challenge their
convictions.165 “Prosecutors have sought to narrowly constrain the
availability of postconviction DNA testing, citing financial concerns, the
need for finality in the criminal justice system, the need to protect the
system of plea bargaining, and the specter of a wave of frivolous
requests.”166 According to one scholar, finality is an “essential part of the
prosecutor’s bargain,” and “the finality of a plea-bargained case is the
indispensable element of the plea bargain itself.”167 This author goes on to
argue that to alter the terms of “finality” in the plea-bargaining context
would “rewrite the main purpose of the agreement after the fact” and have
“major, largely unforeseeable ramifications upon the system.”168 However,
the need for justice and truth outweighs the government’s interest in
finality; “[i]f verdicts were taken as absolutely final, then our law would be
a ‘pretender to absolute truth.’”169 One expert noted:
Postconviction relief assumes by its very existence that finality and comity will be set
aside in the appropriate case. The goal is to identify that case, not to balance interests
for the sake of achieving some politically expedient consensus. Taken to their logical
170
conclusion, finality and comity would preclude postconviction relief altogether.
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While finality may be a highly compelling interest in other areas of law,
when an innocent person’s liberty is at stake, other interests are more
important. In addition, allowing broader access to postconviction remedies
may actually increase the sense of finality; recent studies suggest that
posttrial DNA testing has more often resulted in confirming the defendant’s
guilt than in proving his innocence.171
Some have also argued that letting defendants plead guilty in exchange
for the benefit of reduced sentences and then later use state resources to
contest their sentences would encourage guilty defendants to game the
system and attempt to get out on technicalities.172 However, any convicted
defendant, whether guilty or innocent, will always have incentives to appeal
a conviction. Also, the likelihood of success in postconviction proceedings
is very slim and requires a petitioner to meet a high burden of proof. For
example, as one commentator notes:
DNA is effective proof of innocence only in a limited category of cases. Only where
biological material can be unequivocally attributed to the perpetrator of a crime and
where the suspect can be excluded as the donor of the biological material is the DNA
evidence “proof” of innocence. This is likely to be the case only in sex crimes or in
cases in which the criminal actor—and only the criminal actor—has left biological
material at the site of a crime. Many crimes—even crimes of violence—include no
such evidence. In a wide variety of cases, then, DNA evidence cannot dispositively
173
rule out a potential suspect.

Because there is already such a high burden of proof and slim
likelihood of success in postconviction proceedings, the fear that expanding
postconviction rights to those who plead guilty will lead to actually guilty
defendants escaping liability is simply unwarranted. Many states have
already put safeguards in place to address this issue, as well as concerns
about costs, either by requiring a defendant to cover the costs of DNA
testing himself174 or by requiring a petitioner to show that a favorable result
from the DNA testing would be likely to change the result on retrial or
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demonstrate the petitioner’s actual innocence.175
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four examples from the
Introduction demonstrate,176 lack of clarity in state postconviction statutes
leads to inconsistent results in the courts. While in the case of the Dixmoor
Five, the judge ruled that those who plead guilty are meant to be excluded
from postconviction remedies, in the very similar Englewood Four case, the
judge ruled that those who plead guilty are not barred from bringing
postconviction petitions based on newly discovered evidence.177 State
statutes governing postconviction remedies should be made clearer in order
to prevent confusion in the courts, and states that do not already grant
defendants who plead guilty explicit access to postconviction remedies
should amend their statutes to do so.
DNA or other forensic evidence that excludes a defendant is one of the
most powerful forms of evidence of innocence, yet in several states people
who plead guilty are denied access to this evidence. Again, the Dixmoor
Five and Englewood Four cases in Illinois provide a powerful example of
how denying defendants who plead guilty access to DNA testing is contrary
to the interests of justice. In Illinois, individuals who plead guilty are
barred from later seeking DNA testing, but those who are convicted at trial
are eligible to file a motion for DNA testing.178 In both the Dixmoor Five
and Englewood Four cases, several of the defendants were convicted by a
jury at trial.179 As such, the codefendants who did not plead guilty were
eligible to file a motion for DNA testing on the evidence, which they
ultimately did. The results of the DNA tests came back as not only
excluding all of the codefendants who were originally convicted in each
case, but also as matching a convicted criminal. Fortunately for those who
pleaded guilty, they had codefendants who had proceeded to trial and were
thus eligible to have the testing done, but what about cases where there are
no codefendants?
To prevent this kind of inconsistency and arbitrary line-drawing, state
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statutes should explicitly allow all defendants, including those who plead
guilty, the ability to petition courts for postconviction DNA testing.
Concerns about costs can be alleviated by requiring defendants who can
afford it to pay for the costs of testing and by limiting testing to cases where
the results of testing would be materially relevant to determining who
committed the crime. To prevent defendants from “manipulating the
system,” postconviction DNA statutes may require defendants to show “[a]
reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or
would have received a lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained
through DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution”180 as a
prerequisite to testing.
The absurdity of the distinction between those who plead guilty and
those convicted at trial is further demonstrated by the Illinois courts’
inconsistent application of the postconviction statute. Once the DNA hit to
a convicted sex offender came back, all five of the Dixmoor codefendants
had been proven equally innocent. However, based on one judge’s
construction of the applicable statute, individuals who plead guilty would
not have access to the proceedings by which those convicted at trial may
move to have their convictions vacated. To vacate only the convictions of
those who went to trial, but to let stand the convictions of the codefendants
who pleaded guilty makes absolutely no sense; any statutory interpretation
that would compel this result cannot be valid.
In addition to allowing defendants who plead guilty to use statutory
postconviction remedies, it should be impermissible for defendants who
plead guilty to waive their postconviction rights in plea agreements. As
several states have recognized, there are serious problems with the practice
of allowing defendants who plead guilty to waive these rights.
Postconviction remedies are generally the only avenue available for
defendants to raise constitutional violations from their initial criminal
proceedings, and to allow defendants to waive these rights would be to let
constitutional violations on the part of defense attorneys, prosecutors,
judges, and other government officials go unnoticed and without remedy.
In 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder reversed a Bush Administration
policy under which federal prosecutors were allowed to seek waivers of
DNA testing rights from defendants who plead guilty.181 At the time,
180
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defense lawyers stated that under the previous policy, their clients were
“essentially forced to sign the waivers or lose the benefits of a plea
agreement, such as a lighter sentence.”182 In reversing the policy, Attorney
General Holder emphasized that “DNA evidence is one of the most
powerful tools available to the criminal justice system, and these new steps
will ensure the department can use DNA to the greatest extent possible to
solve crimes and ensure the guilty are convicted.”183 In response to this
change, Peter Neufeld, cofounder of the Innocence Project, stated, “It never
made any sense to force people, as a condition of a plea, to give up their
right to future DNA testing, particularly since we know that factually
innocent people plead guilty.”184
Beyond DNA-testing waivers, in Hood v. State, the Supreme Court of
Nevada noted the potential consequences of allowing defendants to waive
their constitutional postconviction rights in plea agreements. In holding
that “[i]t would be unconscionable for the state to attempt to insulate a
conviction from collateral constitutional review by conditioning its
willingness to enter into plea negotiations on a defendant’s waiver of the
right to pursue postconviction remedies,” the court stated that:
If postconviction remedies could be waived, the state could prevent a defendant from
challenging an involuntary guilty plea or a conviction entered without jurisdiction.
Although we do not suggest that the state would act in bad faith in obtaining
convictions, we must recognize that it has been a historical function of the courts to
construe the legal limits of prosecution under statutory and constitutional law. On
occasion, it has been necessary for the courts to curb prosecutorial abuses, or to
construe the law in a manner inconsistent with the views of prosecutorial authorities.
These judicial functions would be impaired, and the lack of judicial review could raise
185
doubts concerning the constitutional validity of criminal judgments.

In addition, allowing defendants to waive their rights to postconviction
remedies in plea agreements presents a dangerous and unacceptable conflict
of interest for defense attorneys. Ineffectiveness of defense counsel is a
claim that can generally only be raised postconviction, so defense attorneys
have an added incentive to encourage their clients to take plea agreements
in which they waive their postconviction rights. A publication issued by the
American Bar Association noted that “these waivers work to insulate the
plea and government and defense counsel’s respective actions from any
review. Importantly, ethics bodies in five of six jurisdictions, which have
considered the question, have issued opinions excluding ineffective
182
183
184
185
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assistance of counsel claims from the scope of permissible postconviction
waivers.”186 This exact problem was noted in Chaney v. State, where at a
change of plea hearing the plea counsel stated as follows:
Judge, actually I’d like to make a record as to the waiver of the post-conviction
rights . . . . [I]t is the position of the Public Defender’s Office that it would be a
conflict of interest for me to advise [my client] to waive his post-conviction rights
because one of the prongs of that is effective assistance of counsel and it puts me in a
very improper position to advise [my client] whether or not I did a good job for
187
him.

Despite this valid concern, the court went on to allow the defendant to
waive his postconviction rights, stating that as long as the waiver is made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, it is valid.188 However, to
eliminate conflicts of interest and preserve defendants’ rights to
constitutional review of their plea attorneys’ performances, this type of
waiver should not be permitted.
V. CONCLUSION
We know that innocent people plead guilty to crimes they did not
commit, yet the statutes governing postconviction relief for those who plead
guilty are varied and unclear. As a result, the postconviction remedies
available to those who plead guilty yet assert their innocence are currently
inadequate to ensure that innocent people do not serve time for crimes they
did not commit. Some states explicitly include those who plead guilty in
their postconviction statutes and grant them access to DNA testing,
postconviction petitions, or habeas corpus petitions. Some states explicitly
exclude those who plead guilty from their postconviction statutes, denying
them the opportunity to have DNA testing performed on evidence from
their cases, denying them access to the courts, or denying them the
opportunity to file habeas corpus petitions.
However, most states do not explicitly include or exclude those who
plead guilty in their postconviction statutes, instead leaving it to the courts
to decide whether those who plead guilty can later seek DNA testing or
challenge their convictions. Some state courts have decided to include
those who plead guilty, some have decided to exclude them, and others
have decided to limit their rights and the situations in which those who
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plead guilty can access the courts or forensic testing. Further, some states
allow those who plead guilty to waive their postconviction rights in plea
agreements, forfeiting the opportunity to have a court review the processes
by which they were convicted.
As the law currently stands, most state laws do not adequately address
either the issue of wrongful convictions of those who plead guilty or that of
constitutional violations in the context of guilty pleas. In order to remedy
this situation, state statutes should be amended specifically to include those
who plead guilty, thereby eliminating any confusion or inconsistency in the
courts. This is the only way to ensure that everyone’s constitutional rights
are protected, as we know that the same issues that lead to wrongful
convictions at trial also lead to wrongful convictions through guilty pleas.
In addition, postconviction DNA testing statutes should not distinguish
between those who plead guilty and those convicted at trial. Most states
have passed postconviction DNA testing laws because of an interest in
determining with as much certainty as possible whether the person who was
convicted of a crime is the person who actually committed the crime. This
question is still present in cases where someone pleads guilty. In most
states, petitioners are responsible for bearing the costs of postconviction
DNA testing, so expanding this right to include those who plead guilty
would not be an added burden on state resources. In the interests of justice
and certainty, all people, including those who plead guilty, should be given
access to postconviction DNA or other forensic testing if the results of the
testing would be materially relevant to determining who committed the
crime.
Finally, all states should pass statutes prohibiting defendants from
waiving their postconviction rights during the plea-bargaining process.
Allowing defendants to waive their postconviction rights effectively
insulates the process by which pleas are taken from ever being reexamined
and opens the door for law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct to
occur and go without remedy. In addition, allowing defendants to waive
their postconviction rights, including the right to allege ineffective
assistance of counsel, creates perverse incentives for defense attorneys who
counsel their clients on whether or not to accept a plea deal. These issues
compromise the integrity of the criminal process and undoubtedly lead to
injustice.
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